The Black Youth Employment Crisis by Robert I. Lerman
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Black Youth Employment Crisis
Volume Author/Editor: Richard B. Freeman and Harry J. Holzer, editors




Chapter Title: Do Welfare Programs Affect the Schooling and Work Patterns
of Young Black Men?
Chapter Author: Robert I. Lerman
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6292
Chapter pages in book: (p. 403 - 441)11  Do Welfare Programs Affect 
the Schooling and Work 
Patterns of Young Black 
Men? 
Robert I. Lerman 
11.1  Introduction 
Youths from poor and near-poor households have traditionally con- 
tributed to their families by working and sharing their earnings, even 
if  that  meant  leaving school at an early  age.  Given  their financial 
needs, one might expect that  low-income youths work as much as 
or more than youths from moderate- and high-income families. The 
reality is that poor and near-poor youths experience extremely high 
rates  of joblessness.  Moreover,  their  subpar employment and  high 
unemployment, are not entirely associated with the job-finding prob- 
lems of  black  youths (who tend to live in  low-income households). 
Low-income  white  youths  also have  high  unemployment  rates  and 
low employment-population ratios. 
The job market problems of low-income youth may result from lo- 
cation barriers, inadequate education, lack of  family connections to 
jobs,  a decline  in  agricultural  and other unskilled jobs,  little or no 
knowledge of  the job market and how to search for jobs, poor work 
attitudes, and employment discrimination against black and Hispanic 
youth. Other papers in this volume analyze several of these possible 
causes. 
This paper instead looks at the role of income-transfer programs in 
explaining the employment problems of low-income black youth. It is 
natural to consider the impact of welfare benefits because they reduce 
both the urgency of the need to work and the potential gain from work. 
The scope of  welfare effects on income and racial differentials  is 
substantial. In 1980,68 percent of children in low-income families lived 
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in female-headed households, and 53 percent of black children aged 14 
to 17 lived in families with no father present. It is among these single- 
parent families that welfare and other income-support benefits account 
for a large share of income and could affect labor market outcomes. 
Moreover, the rise in black youth unemployment took place over the 
years of rapid growth in the welfare rolls. Although the latter increase 
slowed during the mid-l970s, young black women since then have been 
having children with no father present at rates high enough to insure 
the continuation of high rates of participation in the welfare system.2 
In spite of the widespread  interest in  racial differentials in  youth 
unemployment and the importance of welfare to the black population, 
no one to my  knowledge has systematically  analyzed the impact of 
welfare  and  other income  transfers on youth  employment and  un- 
employment. In the last major NBER volume on the youth employ- 
ment  problem, only  one chapter (Freeman  1982) gave  the welfare- 
employment issue more  than  passing  attenti~n.~  Although  Freeman 
found no effect on youth employment patterns in SMSAs caused by 
variations in area Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)/ 
population  ratios, his individual-level  regressions  showed that living 
in a family receiving welfare, food stamps, and public housing exerted 
significant (though not always negative) effects on the work patterns 
of young men. These results are of interest, but they  indicate  little 
about how welfare affects schooling and work or about potential  ra- 
cial differentials in such effects. 
High unemployment  among youths from families on welfare could 
result from several causes. One is that youth labor supply may decline 
in response to the high benefit-reduction rates that lower net wage rates 
and to the benefit levels that raise family income. Such effects may be 
especially pronounced among youths whose families receive benefits 
from a combination of programs. In addition to discouraging youths 
from accepting  low-wage jobs, welfare incentives  may lead  them to 
take informal or illicit jobs that are easy to misreport. 
Some economists have  closely  investigated  the  employment  and 
schooling effects of benefit reduction rates and income guarantees pro- 
vided through experimental negative income tax payments. As we will 
see below, however, the rules for actual income-support programs differ 
markedly from those used in the income-maintenance experiments. 
West (1978) and Venti (1983), in analyses of youths’ work responses 
to similar incentives provided  through  a negative  income tax (NIT), 
found that NIT plans did tend to reduce empl~yment.~  To some extent, 
positive NIT effects on schooling offset  these negative  employment 
effects. The two analyses yielded somewhat differing results, however, 
on the size of the offsetting effects on schooling. Venti’s overall esti- 
mate of NIT effects on whether 16- to 21-year-olds attended school or 405  Do Welfare Programs Affect School and Work Patterns? 
worked was near zero, whereas West’s results for 19- to 24-year-olds 
indicated the NIT increased the share neither at work nor at school. 
An alternative to the welfare incentives explanation is the cultural- 
environmental view. According to this view, the same factors account- 
ing for the family’s poverty and welfare status also weaken the youth’s 
chances in the labor market.  Examples of such factors are high un- 
employment, racial discrimination, poor schooling, and few contacts 
with relatives who hire or have access to other jobs. The absence of 
the youth’s father no doubt contributes to poverty and welfare status, 
and possibly to youth unemployment as well. 
A third possibility  is that young women who become mothers and 
family heads at an early age do not complete their education or gain 
experience in entry-level jobs because of their child care responsibil- 
ities. Welfare might even affect young men not receiving any transfers. 
If  welfare were to encourage childbearing among young, unmarried 
women, young men responsible for child support payments may avoid 
making them in part by looking for  jobs that are hard to track. Finally, 
on the positive side, welfare income may encourage young people to 
complete their schooling and to participate in government employment 
and training programs. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of these factors and 
assess their importance in  determining the school and labor market 
outcomes of young black  men. Because this study is one of the first 
to concentrate on the welfare-employment relationship, its emphasis 
is on presenting several results from two large bodies of data, rather 
than on insuring the most refined models and estimation techniques. 
The next section examines the potential dimensions of the effects 
by estimating the numbers of all youths and of black youths who receive 
some form of income transfer. Given the underreporting in the census 
surveys and the turnover on the AFDC rolls,  this task is far from 
straightforward. The third section examines in more detail the ways in 
which welfare programs may influence youth labor market outcomes. 
In particular,  it reviews the rules concerning the treatment of youth 
earnings under AFDC and other income-transfer programs. 
The fourth section outlines a research methodology and derives es- 
timates of welfare and family effects on young black men. Finally, the 
fifth section gives some brief concluding remarks about the findings 
and their implications for racial differentials in employment. 
11.2  Numbers and Characteristics of Youths in Welfare Families 
Learning about youths in welfare families is difficult largely because 
of the underreporting or nonreporting of welfare income in household 
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of labor-force data on the U.S. population, has in recent years included 
questions on in-kind as well as cash-transfer programs. Yet  underre- 
porting and nonreporting  of transfer income are substantial. In  1980 
recipients reported  only 66 percent  of  benefits paid.5 The extent of 
nonreporting is unclear because the CPS measures receipt of AFDC 
at any time over the year, while administrative sources record only 
AFDC receipts in a particular month. 
The biannual AFDC surveys are one source of data on the numbers 
of youths in AFDC families. According to the March 1979 AFDC sur- 
vey, 3.4 million families were recipients in that month. Over two million 
youths in the 16-24 age group lived in those families. About one million 
youths aged 16 to 20 were AFDC mothers. Nearly all the AFDC youths 
were either in school or mothers of young children. Perhaps this is one 
reason why employment levels reported on the AFDC survey are in- 
credibly low. Of the 680,000 youths aged 16 to 20 who were part of the 
AFDC unit, only 5 percent had earnings reported on the survey.6 
The best way to determine the numbers and characteristics of youths 
in families receiving welfare and other income transfers is to turn to 
surveys of  youths. This paper employs the 1979 through 1981 waves 
of  the National Longitudinal  Surveys of  Labor  Market  Experience 
(NLS) when focusing on youth as a whole and the NBER Survey of 
Inner-City Black Youth when analyzing young black men living in black 
communities in Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Together the two 
surveys offer a rich body  of information on income transfers.  Both 
provide data on own and household AFDC benefits. Data on food stamp 
benefits ‘received by the young respondents are available in both sur- 
veys,  but the NLS does not  record food  stamps received by  other 
household members. Although housing benefits in the form of public 
housing appear in both surveys, only the NLS includes data on rent 
subsidies. 
Table 11.1 draws on the NLS data to display the characteristics of 
the nation’s youth population in 1979, by receipt of AFDC and by age, 
schooling, and race. The share of  minority youths in AFDC units is 
substantial,  especially  among high  school  students and  high  school 
dropouts.  As expected, young women show up on welfare in larger 
numbers than young men, except among 16- to 17-year-olds. 
The strong relationship between family status, race, and the presence 
of children emerges in tables 11.2 and 11.3. Black and Hispanic young 
men often find themselves in welfare families because of the absence 
of the father and because one-parent minority families rarely achieve 
moderate income levels. More interesting are the differences between 
black and Hispanic young men and between all blacks and ghetto blacks. 
Young Hispanic men move away from the parental home sooner than 
do black men; when they do live away from their parents, Hispanics Table 11.1 
Age, 
School Status  Hispanics  Blacks  Whites  Total  Hispanics  Blacks  Whites  Total 
Welfare Status by Age, Race, Gender, and School Status, 1979 (numbers [in thousands] and percent in welfare families) 
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Source: Unpublished tabulations from the NLS 408  RobertLerman 
are unlikely to remain in welfare families. As expected, blacks in the 
low-income areas of the three cities show much higher welfare rates 
than do blacks in the nation as a whole. Their higher involvement in 
welfare comes largely from the substantial welfare rates of ghetto two- 
parent families. 
A surprisingly large share of black young men continue residing at 
home even through their early twenties. In the NBER sample, only 17 
percent of 20- to 21-year-olds live away from their parents or another 
responsible relative. Even at ages 22 to 24, about 60 percent still reside 
with parents or other responsible relatives. At the national level, young 
black men do move away from their parental home at a higher rate 
than they do in low-income areas. Nevertheless, the tendency to remain 
in a parental home is still substantially higher among young black men 
than  among young Hispanic  or young white  men.  In  1979 over 70 
percent of  blacks 20 to 21  years old lived at home, whereas only 55 
percent of  young Hispanics and 53 percent of young whites did so. 
Racial differentials in the family characteristics of  youths are espe- 
cially significant among young women. Note in table 11.3 that among 
Table 11.2  Family Head and Welfare Status of 16- to 21-Year-Old Men, by 
Race: The Nation and Blacks in Three Poor Urban Areas 
Inner-City 
National Sample (NLS)  Sample (NBER) 
Family and Welfare 
Status  Hispanics  Whites  Blacks  Blacks 
Living with Bofh  Parents 
Total Number 
Percent of Total in 
Any Family Status 
Percent in Family with 
Welfare Income 
Living with One Parent 
Total Numbert 
Percent of Total in 
Any Family Status 
Percent in Family with 
Welfare Income 
Living with Neither Parent 
Total Numbert 
Percent of Total in 
Any Family Status 






































.The numbers are in thousands from the NLS and in actual numbers from the NBER 
survey. The NBER survey includes only those who reported knowledge of whether the 
family received any welfare income. 
Source: Unpublished tabulations from the NLS and NBER survey. Table 11.3  Welfare and Marital Status of 16- to 21-Year-Old Women With and Without 
Children, by Age and Race, 1979 
Hispanics  Blacks  Whites 
Age, Marital and Welfare  With  Without  With  Without  With  Without 
Status  Children  . Children  Children  Children  Children  Children 
16- 17 
Percent of  Total 
Percent Married 
Percent in Families 
with Welfare Income 
18-19 
Percent of Total 
Percent Married 
Percent in Families 
with Welfare Income 
20-21 
Percent of Total 
Percent Married 
Percent in Families 
with Welfare Income 
16-21 
Percent of  Total 
Percent Married 
Percent in Families 




















































30.7  15.7  48.6  17.1  15.3  2.4 
Source: Tabulations from NLS. 410  Robert Lerman 
16- to 21-year-olds, the share of  black women with a child is three 
times the share of white women in the same age group. The racial 
differentials among young, unmarried mothers are even more dramatic. 
Nearly three of  every ten black women aged 16 to 21  are unmarried 
mothers, as compared to only three of 100 whites and about one of ten 
Hispanics. These differences in family characteristics account for al- 
most all  the racial and ethnic differentials in  the receipt  of welfare 
income. 
The contact with income transfers for youths and their families goes 
beyond receipt of cash welfare. It may include food stamp, medicaid, 
and housing benefits. Table 11.4 displays the combinations of benefits 
going to youths and their families in the three-city, low-income sample 
and, on a less detailed basis, to youths throughout the nation. About 
half of the NBER sample with usable data reported benefits going either 
to themselves or to another member of the household. Most households 
receiving benefits obtained aid from more than one program.  One in 
four of the families receiving transfers lived in public housing and had 
neither welfare nor food stamp income. On the other hand, over half 
were on welfare and in at least one other program. 
The NLS data point to a relatively small overlap between housing 
and welfare benefits. Although the percentage of minority youths living 
in families that receive benefits from welfare and housing is many times 
that of white youths, the percentage receiving combined welfare and 
housing benefits is small for all groups. 
11.3  Welfare Rules and Potential Employment Effects 
Any serious effort to assess how welfare benefits affect youth em- 
ployment must begin with a specification of the financial parameters 
relevant to labor market outcomes. A large body of work on the effects 
of NIT plans provides a conceptual basis for relating budget constraints 
to empirical analyses. Still, there is no substitute for a systematic re- 
view of specific program rules. 
Understanding  the benefit structures of  income-support programs 
can prove helpful in distinguishing the financial incentive explanation 
from the cultural-environmental view. In general, assessing the con- 
tribution  of  each aspect  of  those structures is difficult because  the 
poorest families will  have access to the highest benefits,  while also 
being the least able to undertake acts that enhance youth job oppor- 
tunities, such as providing jobs, job-related skills, and role models. 
11.3.1  Welfare Coverage, Benefit Structures, and Work Incentives 
Researchers and policy analysts have provided detailed examinations 
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Table 11.4  Combinations of Benefits Received by  Households of Black 
Youths,  NBER and NLS Samples, 1979 
Inner-City Sample (NBER) 
~~ 
Benefits 
Benefits Received by Other  Received 
Household Members  by Youth 
Family Head 
Combinations  Mother and  Other Adult  Youth Head 
of Benefits  Father  One Parent  Relative  of Household 
Percent Missing 



















24.4  36.1  28.1  1.4 
70.0  37.9  46.2  64.9 
I .9  3.7  3.1  0.4 
11.3  20.4  20.3  12.4 
11.5  16.9  15.2  16.3 
5.3  21.1  15.2  5.8 
National Sample (NLS) 
Hispanic  Black  White 
Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Percent with Welfare 
or Housing Benefits  24.8  25.4  34.6  37.3  4.2  6.3 
Percent with Public 
Housing or Rent 
Subsidies Only  2.9  2.9  8.5  9.4  0.8  1.6 
Percent with Both 
Welfare and 
Housing Benefits  4.5  2.4  7.4  6.6  0.5  0.4 
Source: Tabulations from NBER survey and NLS. 412  Robert Lerman 
discussion usually begins by describing the AFDC treatment of earnings 
and then moves on to show the combined impact on net earnings from 
benefit reductions associated with food stamps, medicaid, and subsi- 
dized housing programs. Prior to changes mandated  in  1981, AFDC 
earnings beyond  $30 per month  were  subject to a marginal benefit- 
reduction rate of 66*/3 percent, though recipients gained credits for all 
work expenses. Because of the liberal treatment of work expenses, 
AFDC recipients often apparently faced low average tax rates on earn- 
ings. The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act tightened the rules 
in order to restrict the earnings welfare recipients could retain without 
any loss of AFDC benefits. In addition, it limited income eligibility for 
AFDC to 150 percent of the state’s standard of need, a change that 
has removed large numbers of recipients from the AFDC rolls. 
In general, the food stamp program requires reductions in benefits 
with added earnings, at a marginal rate  of  about  24  to 25  percent. 
Housing programs providing subsidized rents call for the rental pay- 
ment of the recipient to rise by about 25 cents for each dollar increase 
in earnings. 
These aspects of how income support programs treat recipient earn- 
ings are relatively well known, but rules on youth earnings are less so. 
It turns out that AFDC benefits do not decline at all with the earnings 
of dependent children who are full-time or part-time students not hold- 
ing a full-time job. This important fact means that each dollar of the 
youth’s net earnings does far more to raise spendable family income 
than each dollar earned by others in the family. It also implies that in- 
school youths face no AFDC tax rate to reduce the gain from working. 
For youths who are not in school, AFDC’s treatment of earnings is 
tied into its definition of the family AFDC unit. Under AFDC the unit 
eligible for benefits and subject to benefit reductions need not corre- 
spond to the  nuclear family (or census family unit  of  people living 
together related by blood, marriage, or adoption). Until the 1981 Budget 
Reconciliation Act, about three-quarters of  states classified children 
ages 18-21  as in the unit only if they were attending a school or training 
program.8 Thus, the only children whose benefits were subject to AFDC 
benefit reductions were out-of-school 16- to 17-year-olds. Yet even for 
this group the potential reductions in family benefits from their earnings 
cannot be large, since families can choose to exclude the youths from 
the increase in the family’s grant available for an additional person. 
The increment to the grant level varies across states and sometimes 
with the size of  the family. In Massachusetts, for example, each ad- 
ditional person beyond  the first raised the maximum grant by  about 
$65 per month in 1983. Other states granted incremental amounts that 
varied from about $30 per month in Mississippi to over $100 per month 
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of 50 percent, families whose out-of-school children earned $100 per 
week  would  maximize their income  by  excluding children from the 
family’s grant. 
Youth work disincentives probably are also small under food stamps. 
As  in  AFDC, the food stamp program  disregards  student earnings 
through age 18. Earnings of children older than  18 reduce the grant at 
a marginal rate of 24  percent, net of allowable work expenses. But, 
again, the family can simply report the youth as outside the household 
if  he or she finds a well-paying job. The family’s loss would then be 
the food stamps of one household member, or  about $65 per month in 
1983. 
The earnings of youths in public housing or rent-subsidized units are 
subject to benefit reductions that come in the form of increased rental 
payments. Since the regulations do not exclude the earnings of children, 
the family may face an increased rental payment of 25 percent of the 
child’s net earnings. Of course, enforcement of these kinds of provi- 
sions is slack in most areas. 
The interaction among program rules is what determines the budget 
constraint facing  youths from  families  participating  in  several  pro- 
grams. In general, combinations of programs tend to level differences 
in  constraints based  on individual programs.  If  tax  rates from  cash 
welfare are high, the tax rates from in-kind programs add little to the 
cumulative rate. But if  youth earnings are subject to a zero tax rate 
under the cash program, the effects of food stamp and housing benefit 
reductions may  raise  the level  of cumulative  tax rates to nearly  50 
percent. 
This review  suggests, first, that benefit reductions associated with 
AFDC rarely apply to children under age 21. Second, the work dis- 
incentives that affect children result largely from the combined effects 
of AFDC, food stamp, and housing programs. Third, until 1982 AFDC 
and food stamp rules encouraged youths to remain in school at least 
through age 18 and in some states through age 21. Fourth, income and 
tax rate effects vary by school status and age, with AFDC rules ex- 
cluding student earnings through age 21, but in some states paying a 
higher grant level for students 18 to 21  than for nonstudents 18 to 21. 
Finally, AFDC and other income-transfer programs have lessened the 
cost of teenage parenting to young women; this,  in  turn, brings the 
work disincentive features of welfare programs to substantial numbers 
of young potential workers. 
11.3.2  Potential Employment Effects 
The program rules discussed above suggest that welfare’s work dis- 
incentive effects often do not apply to youths in welfare families. How, 
then, might we expect welfare programs to influence youth employment 414  Robert Lerman 
patterns? One possibility is that by providing benefits that raise family 
incomes, welfare programs lessen the need for young people to work 
and thus reduce their labor-force participation. A second way they may 
affect youth employment is to stimulate longer schooling, which in turn 
would reduce youth labor-force participation.  On the basis of the in- 
centives embedded in the program rules, we would expect that income- 
support benefits will both exert a larger negative effect on nonstudents 
than on students and encourage youths to remain in school, especially 
in those states that pay benefits on behalf of students 18 to 21 years 
old. 
A third and significant potential role played by welfare programs is 
their effect  on childbearing by  young women,  especially unmarried 
young women. If welfare programs do increase childbearing, the effect 
would almost certainly have negative consequences for the employment 
and earnings of young women. And it is also possible that this negative 
employment  outcome will extend to young absent fathers.  If  these 
young men have to make child-support payments to the state that rise 
with their earnings, these obligations will  act as a tax on earnings, 
except in the case of the worker finding an off-the-books job. 
A fourth issue is welfare’s indirect impact  on youth employment 
resulting from the negative effect on work by the youth’s parent. In 
other work, I found that parents’ nonemployment exerted a negative 
impact on their children’s employment, holding the children’s char- 
acteristics con~tant.~ 
A fifth potential work disincentive may arise from the experience on 
welfare. Gaining familiarity with the use of public income support may 
exert an impact that is distinct from the pure financial incentives of 
welfare. This is one reason why we might expect welfare programs to 
exert different effects from those of an experimental NIT. 
We  should distinguish between  welfare  as a cause of  poor  labor 
market outcomes for youths and merely its association with those out- 
comes. Youths in welfare families are likely to have lower than average 
education, work experience, and other employment-related abilities, 
for reasons that have little to do with the family’s receipt of a welfare 
benefit. Some of these differences are difficult to measure, especially 
the differences in motivation that may explain why some families who 
are eligible for benefits do not actually take them. To  the extent that 
unmeasured attitudinal and motivational factors determine the welfare 
status of the family, one might find negative program effects that ac- 
tually represent differences among family background factors. None- 
theless, the association between welfare status and weak employment 
outcomes is of  policy interest  even if  causation does not  run from 
welfare to unemployment. Establishing strong associations can help in 
the targeting of benefits at reducing youth unemployment and in con- 415  Do Welfare Programs Affect School and Work Patterns? 
sidering what program features  affect unemployed  youth  and could 
affect efforts to lower youth unemployment. For this reason, this paper 
will analyze the direct connection between welfare programs and un- 
employment among low income and black youth. 
In examining welfare’s causal role in reducing youth employment, 
the remainder of the paper will focus on three major questions: 
1. How do welfare programs alter the current employment of low- 
income and black young men? 
2.  How does the mix of family and program characteristics associ- 
ated with income-transfer programs affect school enrollment, employ- 
ment, and unemployment among low-income and black youths? 
3.  To  the extent that  any welfare-induced  effects occur, do they 
account for any of the racial differences in youth employment outcomes? 
11.4  Welfare and Family Effects among Young Men 
Welfare rules and youth behavior suggest that responses to transfer 
programs and family characteristics will vary sharply between young 
men and young women. Young men in a welfare family generally will 
be living with one or both parents or another adult relative. In contrast, 
young women often become unmarried mothers and draw benefits on 
their own.  Among the other differences  are the more extensive  in- 
volvement of young men in illicit income-generating activities and the 
different occupational interests and opportunities of young men and 
women. Finally, the NBER survey dealt exclusively with young men. 
For all these reasons, the analysis examines the labor market experi- 
ence of young men only. 
The first task is to offer descriptive information on the school and 
work behavior of young men. Tables 1  1.5 and 1  1.6 display an exclusive 
and exhaustive breakdown of activities by age, race, and welfare status 
for young men in the NBER and NLS samples, respectively. In both 
samples, young men in families receiving welfare are more likely than 
other youth to fall into the two least desirable activities-not  in school 
and unemployed or outside the labor force. Among the younger groups, 
though the share in jobs and not in school differs only moderately by 
welfare status, those not in welfare families are much more likely to 
attend school than those in welfare families. The differences in activity 
status are especially striking among 19- to 24-year-old black men in the 
low-income urban areas. Moreover, the ranking across groups by ben- 
efit category shows that youth outcomes worsen as one moves from 
public housing only to welfare only and then to the combination of 
welfare and public housing. The combined benefit group has astound- 
ingly poor labor market outcomes, with out-of-school unemployment 
rates of 76 percent. Table 11.5  School and Work Activities of Young Black Men in Low-Income Areas of  Boston, 
Chicago, and Philadelphia, 1979 
Percentage Not in School  Percentage Enrolled in School 
Not in  Not in 
Labor  Labor 















































4.3  22. I 
4.6  18.9 
3.4  14.4 
8.1  12.1 
5.0  18.2 
11.1  8.9 
1.5.9  2.5 
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Source: Tabulations from NBER survey. Table 11.6  School and Work  Activites of a National Sample of Young Men, by Race, Spring 1979 
Percentage Not in School  Percentage Enrolled in School 
Race, Welfare  Not in  Not in 
Status, Age  Employed  Unemployed  Labor Force  Employed  Unemployed  Labor Force 
Blacks 
Welfare 
16-17  12.5 
18- 19  27.4 
20-21  52.3 
16-21  31.0 
No Welfare 
16-17  4.8 
18-19  29.0 
20-21  57.4 
16-21  33.9 
Welfare 
16-17  13.6 
18-19  31.7 
20-21  51.4 
16-21  30.6 
No Welfare 
16-17  5.2 
18-19  40.8 
20-21  52.5 
16-21  38.2 
Welfare  30.1 
No Welfare  33.9 
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The time allocation across activities over the year is another indicator 
of how young men may differ by welfare status. Data on months spent 
by young men in school and labor-force activities appear in table 11.7 
for the NBER sample. Again, the family’s welfare status is associated 
with the school and labor-force patterns of youths ages 19 to 24. Those 
in multibenefit families performed far more poorly than did other young 
men. They spent well over half (7.6 months) of the 13-month period 
neither working nor in school. Those in families receiving no income 
transfers averaged only one-third of the period in the no work, no school 
situation. In comparison to the nonwelfare group, those in multibenefit 
families showed much lower employment-population ratios (.34 versus 
33)  and much higher unemployment rates (49 versus 27 percent). 
11.4.1  A Methodological Overview 
Families that must resort to welfare programs may transmit to young 
men the same weaknesses that led to the earnings problems experienced 
by the parents. Thus, tabulations showing a welfare-employment con- 
nection may actually measure social class differences rather than pro- 
gram effects. We  must guard against ignoring all but program effects, 
since social class differences  are themselves partly the result  of  or 
closely associated with the effects of the income-transfer programs. 
Before describing any specific empirical analysis, I will begin with a 
broad review of the approaches used to distinguish among competing 
explanations concerning the welfare-employment connection. 
To  begin, consider the following four sets of variables: 
Set  Y  = the variables measuring youths’ work and school status. 
Examples are earnings and time allocated to work, school, looking for 
work, and leisure. 
Set A  = welfare program variables and other geographic area char- 
acteristics that are exogenous to the family and youth behavior.  Ex- 
amples are the area’s AFDC plus food stamp income guarantee, local 
availability of public housing slots, and local unemployment rates. 
Set C = family variables measuring race and social class factors that 
affect the family’s probability of receiving income transfers and that 
are directly linked to youths’ activity patterns or are likely to be trans- 
mitted to youths within the family. Examples are personal connections 
to jobs, attitudes about work, native ability, and presence of parents 
in the home. 
Set W = variables measuring the actual receipt of income transfers 
by the youth or the youth’s family. 
Set F = family variables that affect the probability of welfare status 
but that are less likely than set C to exert a direct influence on the 
youth’s school or work status. Examples are family and household 
size. Table 11.7  NBER Sample’s Months in Alternative Labor-Force States, by Age and by School and 
Welfare Status of Families, 1979 
Over Past 13 Months, Mean Number of Months: 
Not in School  Enrolled in School 
Not in  Not in 
Age/  Labor  Labor 
Welfare Status  Employed  Unemployed  Force  Employed  Unemployed  Force 
16-18 
None 
Welfare, No Public 
Public Housing, No 




Total, All Categories 
19-24 
None 
Welfare, No Public 
Public Housing, No 
Welfare and Public 
























I  .7  2.1 
1.9  2.1 
1.8  1.6 
2.2  1.4 
1.9  1.8 
2.0  1 .o 
3.2  0.6 
2.7  0.8 
3.3  0.6 
2.6  0.8 
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Set Z  = variables  that  measure youth-specific characteristics that 
may  have some impact  on youths’ work and school outcomes. Ex- 
amples are grades in school, involvement  in criminal behavior. and 
reservation wages. 
The mix of youth outcomes, Y,  may be causally dependent on vari- 
ables from any or all of sets A,  C,  W,  F, and I. But, the relationships 
among the sets are complex. The C variables help determine W status, 
which in turn affects such C  variables as the work of the family head. 
The C variables may also influence the Z variables. The F and A vari- 
ables partly explain variations  in  W status. Because of the program 
rules and actual program administrative practices (described above in 
section 11.3), we expect the youth outcomes to exert little impact on 
W.  The absence  of  simultaneity  between  W and  Y allows a direct 
estimate of how W variables affect Y.  Nevertheless, several issues arise 
in developing such estimates. 
Consider the following two equations: 
(1)  Wi  = g  (A,  Ci,  Fi)  + ei 
(2)  Yi  = f(Ai,  Ci, Wi,  Zi)  + ui, 
where u and e are error terms. One approach to the question of how 
welfare affects youth outcomes is to examine Ws  effect on  Y.  True, 
W is partly determined by social class and family status, but including 
both  W and C variables in the multivariate models should yield esti- 
mates of  independent effects.  Still, isolating  W’s effect from  the C 
variables  could be difficult because of multicollinearity between the 
two sets of variables.  Including both could understate the full impact 
of welfare, since if  experience on welfare is partly responsible for the 
youth’s living in a one-parent family with no workers, then the neg- 
ative  effects  on youth  outcomes  from  such  C variables  should  be 
partly attributed to the impact of  welfare. The main effect of  multi- 
collinearity would be to make the coefficients unstable. For the most 
important instances of multicollinearity, I provide estimates with  W 
and C variables and with W variables alone. 
Another potential problem arises because the unmeasured attitudinal 
and other factors that cause families to take up welfare might well exert 
an impact on youths’ school and employment outcomes. Families with 
job attitudes or capacities that are poorer than what is captured by 
measured characteristics are more likely to receive benefits as well as 
have children who do not perform well in the labor market. This implies 
an omitted-variable problem, since the error term in equation (2) would 
be correlated with W.  To remove the bias in W’s  impact on Y requires 
one to predict  W as a function of the C,  F, and A variables and then 
to use  the predicted  W values to explain  youth outcomes.  Yet  this 
procedure to purge the influence of unmeasured attitudinal effects may 421  Do Welfare Programs Affect School and Work  Patterns? 
well create an errors-in-variables problem. Suppose, for example, that 
experience on welfare helped shape poor job attitudes. Then, the pre- 
dicted welfare variable would not capture the full impact of welfare. 
If those with a high probability of receiving welfare (based on measured 
characteristics) but whose families never received welfare did well in 
the labor market, it would not imply the absence of an impact from 
welfare.  Rather, the error in  measuring  the  concept  underlying  the 
independent variable would tend to bias downward the estimate of the 
welfare effect. 
Thus,  the  use  of  actual  welfare  status may  either understate  or 
overstate the overall role of welfare in influencing youth outcomes. 
To bound the probable range of welfare effects, I developed estimates 
based on actual as well as predicted values of  W and estimates that 
did  and  did  not  include  indirect effects  of  welfare through  various 
family variables.  When using the NLS sample, one can take advan- 
tage of the natural variability in state welfare levels when estimating 
the predicted welfare status of the youth’s family. The availability in 
the NLS data of this important, exogenous predictor raises the cred- 
ibility of effects based on predicted values. 
This general discussion is not intended to suggest that no econometric 
problems  remain in the following analysis. But as stated above, the 
emphasis in this paper is to examine what relatively basic techniques 
applied to two relatively unmined data sources can tell us about the 
relationship between  welfare and youth employment. The next sub- 
section analyzes, with several techniques, the impact of the welfare 
variables on young black men living in three low-income urban areas. 
Section 1 1.4.3 develops a similar analysis of the welfare effects on the 
nationally representative sample of young black men in the NLS. 
11.4.2  Effects of Transfer Programs and Family Factors on the School 
and Work Activities of Young Black Men in Three Low-Income 
Urban Areas 
The NBER sample comprises young black men ranging from ages 
16 to 24. These ages capture two very different periods of life. Young 
people in the 16-18  period are normally in high school and living at 
home. By age 19, virtually everyone has either completed or dropped 
out of high school. At this point, the school and work experiences of 
young people diverge substantially. Some go to college, others find full- 
time jobs, some go into a training program, and still others find them- 
selves without work or any other constructive activity. The ages 19 to 
24  are also a time when many youths move away from their parents’ 
home. 
For these and other reasons, the sample is divided by age in order 
to undertake the analysis of welfare and family effects. The empirical 
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welfare benefits;  regressions on youth earnings; regressions on  the 
months youths spend working, attending  school, and doing neither; 
and multinomial logit equations on the youths’ current work, job-search, 
and schooling patterns. 
Determinants of the Family’s BeneJit Status 
The tabulations reported above indicated sharp differences between 
youths in families with and without income transfers and between youths 
in  single-benefit and multibenefit families. Given these expectations 
two sets of probits were estimated, one on determinants of any transfers 
and a second on whether or not a family receiving a transfer participated 
in welfare and public housing programs. 
The discussion here will concentrate on the estimates developed on 
“any transfers,” since these showed a closer fit than the ones on mul- 
tibenefit participation. The results of the probit equations for the fam- 
ilies of youths aged  16 to 18  and  19  to 24  appear in  table  11.8. One 
might have expected the determinants of  “any transfers”  to vary by 
the age of the youths, but little difference emerged in the results. 
Family and Welfare  Effects on the Current Work and School Status of 
Youth 
The close interaction between work and school complicates the anal- 
ysis of the current activity  status. Since the mix  of  labor-force and 
school activities are often the outcome of a joint time-allocation de- 
cision, it is appropriate to estimate the effects of the family and welfare 
variables on the probability of taking part in one activity relative to 
the other. The statistical technique for accomplishing this task is mul- 
tinomial logit.I0 The procedure yields estimates of  the impact of  the 
welfare variables on the mix of school, work, and job-search activities. 
The activities used as dependent variables vary by age. The breakdown 
for youths aged 16 to 18 is (1) neither work nor school; (2) work only; 
(3) school only; and (4) both work and school. The breakdown for the 
19- to 24-year-olds is (I) school (whatever the labor-force status); (2) 
work  (not school); (3) unemployed  (not school); and  (4) neither  in 
school nor in the labor force. 
Several specifications provided estimates of the role of the welfare 
and family variables. The welfare variable appeared in three forms: (I) 
the family’s receipt of any income transfer, (2) the predicted probability 
of the family’s receiving any transfer benefit, and (3) two dummy vari- 
ables representing whether the family received any cash welfare, any 
other transfer (but no welfare), or no transfer at all. Given the concern 
about multicollinearity the equations were run  with and without  the 
presence  of  other  workers  in the family  and  with  and  without  the 
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Table 11.8  Determinants of the Welfare Status of Families of Black Young 
Men in the NBER  Sample 
Impact of a 





Welfare  t-Value 
16-18  19-24  16-18  19-24 
Group  Group  Group  Group 
Probability of 
Welfare at the 




16-18  19-24 
Group  Group 




























-  .I6 
.07 






.50  .46  -  .29  -  .25  -6.78  -5.51 
























-  .05 
-  .02 
-  .06 
-  .03 
-  1.38 
-0.61 
-  1.39 
-0.83 
Note: The changes in the probabilities noted in the middle two columns represent the 
impact of  going from zero to  one in  the dichotomous variables and of  a rise of one 
standard deviation in the continuous variables. 
Source: NBER survey. 
The pattern and sign of  the welfare effects are similar across spec- 
ifications, but the significance levels vary sharply. Tables 11.9 and 11.10 
display the estimated effects from  the  equations using the family’s 
receipt of a transfer as the welfare variable and controlling for other 
workers and for the youth’s reservation wage. Additional explanatory 
variables were residence (Chicago, Philadelphia, or Boston); presence 
of the youth’s father, mother, and/or adult worker when the youth was 424  Robert Lerman 
age  14; and the youth’s  grades, illicit  income, age, education, and 
church attendance. 
According to these results, welfare did matter. In three of six cases, 
the family’s receipt of an income transfer exerted significant effects 
that were independent of the current work status of other family mem- 
bers. It is worth noting that several other variables also induced sub- 
stantial effects on a group that one might have thought was otherwise 
relatively homogeneous.  Welfare’s primary influence was to raise the 
probability of being neither in school nor at work, by seven percentage 
points for the 16-18  age group and by  26 points for the  19-24  age 
group. 
Welfare effects on other outcomes also varied by age. In the 16-18 
group, the transfer variable had an insignificant impact on those work- 
ing but not in school (by two percentage points) and on those attending 
school but not working (by six points). This would imply that many 
fewer youths from welfare families were both working and attending 
school than were youths from families receiving no income transfer. It 
is interesting that the combining of school and work is precisely  the 
activity that welfare rules would  tend to encourage by  counting the 
earnings  of  nonstudents  16 to 18 years old while  excluding  student 
earnings. Apparently, welfare incentives had little impact on this group 
of young men. 
Receipt of transfers by the families of the 19- to 24-year-olds exerted 
substantially  larger negative effects.  Transfers lowered by  14 points 
those youths’  probability  of  being  in  school and by  13 points their 
probability of working and being out of school. The result was a shift 
toward staying outside the labor force rather than toward looking for 
work (and thus counted as unemployed). 
Youths who regularly attended church, whatever their other individ- 
ual or family characteristics, had significantly more positive outcomes 
than those with no religious involvement.  This variable probably  re- 
flects attitudes of the family as well as of the youths. As shown above, 
the family’s involvement with transfers was negatively related to fre- 
quent churchgoing. Yet  church attendance was positively associated 
with improved school and work outcomes, whatever the family’s in- 
volvement with income transfers. 
A number of area and individual variables also yield significant and 
interesting  results.  Youths  in  Chicago and Philadelphia had  weaker 
labor market outcomes than youths in Boston. The grades youths re- 
ported receiving in their last year of school were significant indicators 
of the youths’ outcomes. Youths with high grades in school generally 
remained  in  school at much higher rates than other youths. On the 
other hand, youths reporting illegal income showed significantly poorer 
outcomes than other youth.  Illegal  income among the  16-18  group Table 11.9  Determinants of School, Work, and Job-Search Behavior of Black Men 16 to 18 
Years Old in the NBER Sample: Results of  Multinomial Logit Equations 
Effects on No  Effects on  Effects on 
Work, No School  Work, No School  School, No Work 
Explanatory 
Variables  Derivative  t-Value  Derivative  t-Value  Derivative  t-Value 
Constant 
Any Transfer 
1 Worker in Family 




2 Parents Present 
Youth at 14 
1 Parent Present, 
Youth at 14 
1 or More Worker, 
Youth at 14 




Age  18 
HS Graduate 
Mostly As  and B’s 
Half B’s and C’s 
Reservation Wage 








1.85  -.028 
1.99  ,023 
-2.47  -.060 
-2.12  P.027 
2.13  .002 
3.83  ,049 
4.04  ,057 
-  .56 
I  .29 
-2.56 






-  .I59 
-.I19 





-  2.08 
-  1.42 
-  .45 
3.31 
3.44 
,005  .07  .006  .I8  ,071  .62 
,013  .I8  ,006  .I9  ,027  .25 
-  ,024  -  .54  ,027  1.24  -  .088  -  1.31 
-  ,159  -3.32  -.087  -  3.59  .I15  -  1.76 
-  ,156 
-  ,105 
.037 
-  ,097 
-  .I53 
-  .064 
-  2.44 
-  1.76 
.30 
-  1.37 
-  2.28 
-  2.57 




-  ,120 
-  .063 
1,l 14 
-2.19  p.056 
3.08  ,052 
2.99  ,086 
-2.34  p.054 
-2.71  -  ,058 
-2.97  -.002 
-  2.98 
2.95 
3.23 
-  2.49 
-  2.92 
-  .40 
Source: Equations performed on NBER survey data Table 11.10  Determinants of  School, Work, and Job-Search Behavior of  Black Men 19 to 24 Years 
Old in the NBER Sample: Results of Multinomial Logit Equations 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Effects on School, 
Any Labor-Force  Effects on Work 
Status -  and No School 
Derivative  t-Value  Derivative  t-Value 
Constant 
Any Transfer 
1 Worker in Family 




2 Parents Present, 
Youth at 14 
1 Parent Present, 
Youth at 14 
1 or More Worker, 







Mostly As  and B’s 
Half B’s and C’s 
Reservation Wage 
Number of Observations: 927 
,049 
-  ,142 
-  ,019 
-  .029 
-  .004 
-.I19 










-  .015 
.36 
-  2.89 
-  .32 
-  .48 
-  1.64 







-  1.91 
2.75 
I  .49 
I .58 





-  .005 
-  .I59 
-  .I82 
-  ,078 








-  ,054 
.09 




-  1.92 
-  2.22 
-  .62 






-  .70 
.89 
.74 
Effects on Job 
Search of 
Nonemployed 
Derivative  t-Value 
,392  2.18 
,018  .26 
-  ,013  -  .I7 
-  ,057  -  .68 
-  .003  -  1.91 
.058  .66 
-  .071  -  .81 
-  .014  -.12 
-  .013  -.11 
,127  1.64 
,090  1.02 
,060  .83 
,089  1.34 
.I02  1.53 
-  ,070  -  .88 
,053  .69 
-  ,084  -  2.84 
Source:  Equations performed on NBER survey data. 427  Do Welfare Programs Affect School and Work  Patterns? 
meant less schooling; in the  19-24  group, those with illegal income 
were much more frequently out of the labor force and less frequently 
in school, in a job, or looking for a job. 
Sensitivity of the Estimates to Different Specijications 
A variety of interpretations could be consistent with the estimates 
of significant welfare effects observed in tables 11.9 and 11.10. Among 
the possibilities noted above were, first, that the estimates attribute 
too much to welfare, since unmeasured family attitudes may be causing 
both receipt of transfers and the low work achievement of youth and, 
second, that the estimates attribute too little to welfare, since welfare, 
by causing adults to reduce work effort and youths to raise reservation 
wages, has indirect as well as direct negative effects on youth outcomes. 
Estimates derived from other specifications, shown in table  11.11, 
shed some light on the issue. The specifications using predicted receipt 
of transfers  include one that holds constant the youth’s reservation 
wage but not the presence of other workers and a second that holds 
constant the presence of other workers in the family but not reservation 
wages. The predicted values come from the results shown in table 11.8, 
in which the absence of workers in the family is a determinant of the 
receipt of  transfers. Both estimates based on actual transfers are in- 
dependent of  the presence  of  other workers in  the family; the only 
difference is that one includes and one excludes the youth’s reservation 
wage. 
The pattern of  results is similar across specifications, but the size 
and significance of effects are not. By far the largest effects are in the 
specification using the predicted receipt of transfer payments and ex- 
cluding the presence of  other family workers in the youth outcome 
regression. This specification does avoid attributing welfare effects to 
unmeasured family attitudes, but by excluding the presence of  other 
workers it may overstate the role of transfers. On the one hand, the 
specification allows the welfare variable to capture fully the indirect 
impact of other workers on youth outcomes that occurs through its 
effect on the family’s receipt of welfare. On the other hand, this ap- 
proach attributes some direct effects of the presence of other workers 
on youth outcomes to the welfare variable. There is no easy way out 
here, since including the presence of the workers with predicted trans- 
fers leads to multicollinearity. 
The importance of  this multicollinearity is clear from the dramatic 
drop in estimated welfare effects that occurs when one includes the 
presence of other workers in  the family alongside actual or predicted 
receipt of welfare. Without a full modeling of work-welfare and welfare- 
family characteristics interactions-a  job beyond the scope of this pa- 
per and probably not achievable with this data set-one cannot pre- Table 11.11  Estimates of Welfare Effects Based on Alternative Specifications (t-values 
in parentheses) 
Effects on  No Work,  Both School 
16-19  Group  No School  Work Only  School Only  and Work 
No Controls for Other Workers Prejent in Family 
Predicted Transfers  ,502  ,167 
(5.09)  (3.58) 
Any Transfers  ,076  ,023 
(I  .99)  (I  .29) 
Predicted Transfers  ,048  .01  I 
(1.05)  (0.59) 
Any Transfers  .073  ,009 
(2.W  (0.5.5) 
Controls for Presence of Other Workers in Family 
No Controls  for Reservation Wage 
,315  -  ,984 
(2.19) 
.061  -  ,160 
(1.14) 
,060  -.119 
(0.90) 
(0.67) 
.032  -.114 
Not in School 
In School, Any 
Effects on  Labor-Force  Not in 
19-24  Group  Status  Working  Unemployed  Labor Force 
No Controls  for Other Workers Present in Family 
Predicted Transfers  -  .695  ~. 167 
(- 5.80)  (-0.90) 
Controls  for Presence of Other Workers in Family 
Any Transfers  -  .I42  -  ,134 
(  ~  2.89)  (~ 2.03) 
No Controls for Reservation Wage 
In School  Work 
Predicted Transfers  ~  .080  -  .044 
(  ~  1.08) 
Any Transfers  -.116  -  ,107 
(- 3.66)  (-2.68) 
( -  2.47) 
,338  ,524 
(1.85) 
.018  .258 
(0.26) 
Unemployed/ 
Not in Labor Force 
.  I24 
,223 
Source: Multinomial logit equastions performed on NBER survey data. 429  Do Welfare Programs Affect School and Work Patterns? 
cisely distinguish  the effects of the family’s receipt of transfers from 
the presence of other workers. Nevertheless, although the strong link 
between the two variables is well  known, their major importance in 
determining youth outcomes is a striking result that adds to our un- 
derstanding of the employment problems of young black men. 
It is also noteworthy that in spite of the variation in the observed 
effects  of a family’s receipt  of transfers, even the lowest estimates 
indicate a negative influence of welfare on youth outcomes. 
Family and Welfare Effects on Earnings and on School and Work Ac- 
tivities over the  Year 
In examining how family and welfare variables influenced the youths’ 
earnings  and  school and  work activities  over the year prior to the 
interview, one confronts a similar set of specification problems.  This 
section adopts the same strategy as in the preceding section for esti- 
mating the effects of predicted and actual welfare status, including and 
not including the presence of other workers in the family and reser- 
vation wages. 
A summary of the results of ordinary-least-squares  (OLS) equations 
on earnings and on school and work activities appears in tables 11.12 
and 1 1.13. These estimates are broadly similar to the earlier estimates 
of the effects on the youth’s current status. In some specifications of 
the continuous variables, however, the family’s receipt of transfers had 
no negative  effects on the school and work  outcomes of the  16-18 
group. In contrast, transfers were consistently associated with a worse 
mix of current activities. 
Still, the similarities are pronounced. High probabilities of receiving 
transfers induced much larger and more consistently  negative effects 
on the 19-24  age group than on the 16-18  group. The important role 
of family variables associated with welfare shows up in the analysis of 
school and work outcomes over the year as a negative influence on 
youth outcomes, as it did in the analysis of current activities. Youths 
who lived with two or more family members who held a job tended to 
do considerably  better than youths in families without any workers. 
The role of other workers was significant for both age groups. 
11.4.3  Family and Welfare  Effects on a National  Sample of Young 
Black Men 
Conclusions derived from the NBER inner-city sample of Boston, 
Chicago, and Philadelphia youths may or may not hold for a national 
sample of  young black men.  It is worth noting that differences may 
arise either because of genuine variations in relationships across geo- 
graphic areas, because of differences in the data collected, or because 
of differences in the characteristics of youths in the two samples. 430  Robert Lerman 
Table 11.12  Family and Welfare Influences on 16- to 18-Year-Olds: Work  and 
Earnings Patterns During the 13 Months Before the NBER 
Interview 
Months Neither Working 
Nor in School  In Earnings 
Explanatory 




1 Person in Family 
Worked 
2 or More Persons 











Still in School 
Mostly As  and B's 
Half B's  and C's 
1.94"' 
1 .oo" 
3.05"'  6.09"' 
-  .I  .05* 
4.52"' 
-  .I6  .49* 
-  .28  .55** 




-  .88**' 
-  2.02"' 
.76*" 
1.08*** 
-  .89"' 
-  1.99"* 
-  .66*"  -  .81*"  .06  .25 
-  .63**' 
1.37"' 










-  .oo 
.43 
-  .97' 
.63" 
.35 
-  .oo 
.43 
-  .96*** 
.67" 
.39 
-  .87*** Venti, -  .88**' 




2.88  2.88 
.I2  .I2 







Note:  Superscripts, *I*,  **,  and  *  represent  significance  at the one, 5, and  10  percent 
levels, respectively. The regressions also included three variables that were insignificant 
in all regressions: the presence of both parents when the youth was age 14; the presence 
of only one parent when the youth was age 14; and the presence of a worker in the 
family when the youth was age 14. 
Source: Computed from NBER survey data. 
The NLS  data did have  some advantages for this  analysis.  Area 
differences  in  welfare guarantees, labor market conditions, and the 
extent of  urbanization all helped in isolating the role of income trans- 
fers. The three years of data allowed an accounting of prior labor market 
activities and welfare histories in the estimates of current outcomes. 
Determinants  of the Family's  Welfare Status 
How area welfare levels and other welfare variables affect the fam- 
ily's receipt of benefits not only is of interest in itself, it also has special 
importance for assessing the effect of income transfers on young men. 
Consider two families, A and B, that are similar to each other except 431  Do Welfare Programs Affect School and Work Patterns? 
Table 11.13  Family and Welfare Influences on 19- to 24-Year-Olds: Work  and 
Earnings Patterns During the 13 Months Before the NBER 
Interview 
Months Neither Working 
Nor in School  In  Earnings 
Explanatory 





1 Person in Family 
Worked 
2 or More Persons 








Illegal Income in 
Dollars 
HS Graduate 
Still in  School 
Mostly As, B's 
Half B's, C's 
4.41"' 
2.49"' 
4.43"'  6.89"' 
-  1.26" 
5.77"' 
1.81  .07 
.34  .05 
I .05*** 
-  I.  14"' 
-  1.74"' 
-  .63 
1.82"' 
I .87**" 
-  1.11"' 
-  I  .69"' 
1.81"' 
1.85"' 
-  .47  -  .56  .I3  .32 
-  .SO" 
.21 







-  2.16"' 
.03*** 
-  2.19"' 
~  .Ol" 
.96*** 
-  .35 
-.19 
.39 
-  .Ol" 
.99*** 
-  .33 
-.I5 
.39 
-  .61 
-  .81" 
-  .62 
















Nore: Superscripts **I and ** represent significance levels at the one and 5 percent levels, 
respectively. The regressions also included the three insignificant variables noted in Table 
11.12. 
Source: Computed from NBER survey data. 
for state of residence. Assume family A lives in a high-payment state, 
while family B lives in a low- or moderate-payment state. One would 
expect that family A would be more likely to receive welfare than family 
B simply because of the income threshold in its state. Suppose these 
higher guarantees do, indeed, lead to more families receiving payments 
in one state than similar families in other states. Then, we would have 
an ideal situation for identifying independent effects of  welfare. One 
merely  has to examine how youths in  families  that receive welfare 
because of the state's higher income threshold perform relative to youths 
in similar families not on welfare because of low state benefit levels. 
The first step is to analyze whether state benefit levels and other 
area variables have any impact on the welfare status of the families of 432  Robert Lerman 
young black men. Table 1 1.14 displays solid evidence from probit equa- 
tions showing that state benefit levels raised sharply the chances that 
a youth lived in a family receiving welfare. The state’s income guar- 
antee from AFDC and food stamps exerted large and statistically sig- 
nificant effects on the presence of welfare income in 1978, 1979, and 
1980. In 1978, for example, a youth in a family with the mean area and 
family characteristics had a .20 probability of living in a welfare family. 
The results of the probit  equations indicate that  an increase of  one 
standard deviation in the AFDC plus food stamp guarantee level (hold- 
ing other characteristics constant) induced an increase of 8.5 percentage 
points in this probability. 
The  other  area  and  family  variables  generally  had  the  expected 
influences on the family’s receipt of welfare benefits.  One exception 
Table 11.14  Effects of Selected Variables on the Probability of Young Black 
Men Living in a Family Receiving Welfare: Probit Equations for 
1979, 1980, and 1981 
(t-values in parentheses) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Probability at the Mean 
of the Independent 
Variables 
Guarantee (in 100s) 
AFDC Food Stamp 
Big City Residence 
Central City Residence 
Big City  x  Central 
Unemployment High in 
Father Present in 1979 
City 
Area 
Father Present in 1980 
Mother Present in 1979 
Mother Present in 1980 
Family size 
N 
Effects on Receiving Welfare in: 




-  ,149 
(- 2.68) 






















-  ,011 
( -  0.44) 

























Source: Equations performed on NLS data for 1979, 1980, and 1981. 433  Do Welfare Programs Affect School and Work  Patterns? 
was the negative (but usually insignificant) effect of living in a high- 
unemployment area. The pattern of city effects was interesting. Neither 
the pure big city or inner-city effect was positive; instead, what sharply 
and significantly raised the probability of welfare receipt was the com- 
bined effect of living in the inner part of a large city. 
Alternative Estimates of Welfare and Family Effects on Earnings and 
on the School and Work Status of the Nation’s Young Black Men 
Use of a national sample of black young men yields results that have 
general relevance and avoids the potential problem in the NBER data 
of bias due to outmigration of  successful members of welfare families 
from the low-income urban areas. In addition, by drawing on three 
years of NLS data, one can assess how past welfare experience affects 
current employment and earnings as well as whether the estimated 
welfare effects are similar from one year to another. This section reports 
on several empirical efforts to test for welfare and family effects. The 
specific estimates reported here, however, by  no means exhaust the 
potential uses of NLS data to determine the impact of welfare variables. 
The alternative estimates of the family and welfare variables appear 
in table 11.15.  As in the analysis of the NBER inner-city sample, welfare 
effects on the national sample were generally larger and more significant 
among the older group (those 10 to 23 in 1980) than among teenagers 
(16 to 19 in 1980). Note that the impact of living in a family receiving 
cash welfare was to lower the expected 1980 earnings of the 20-23  age 
group by a whopping 100 percent. This effect was independent of the 
youth’s 1978 earnings. Living in a welfare family in 1980 was closely 
associated with negative school and work outcomes in 1981, especially 
among the 20- to 23-year-olds. A change in welfare status raised the 
share neither working nor in  school by 21 percentage points for the 
older group (a  100 percent increase), but by only four points for the 
younger group. 
These estimates of welfare effects may be partly capturing the impact 
of attitudinal or other factors that cause both the family’s receipt of 
welfare and poor outcomes among youths. To  avoid this problem, I 
conducted  a two-stage  procedure  in  which the predicted receipt  of 
welfare (based on the probit equations shown in table 11.13) substituted 
for actual welfare as an explanatory variable  in the youth outcome 
equations. This adjustment should lessen or eliminate bias resulting 
not  only from  unmeasured  factors  causing  both  welfare  and  youth 
outcomes, but also from the consequent  separate-errors-in-variables 
problem. If the experience of young black men on welfare causes poor 
outcomes, then substituting predicted values will not fully take account 
of welfare’s impact on youth employment. Predicted welfare status did 
turn out to exert negative effects on school and work outcomes. Al- 434  Robert Lerman 
Table 11.15  Effects of  Welfare and Family Variables on 1980 Earnings and on 
1981 School and Work  Status of Black Men 16-19 and 20-23  in 
1980 
Probability of Neither 
Work Nor School, 
In  1980 Earnings  1981 
Explanatory Vaiiables  Parameter  t-Value  Derivative  t-value 
Ages 16-23  in 1980: 
Lived in Welfare Family 
Predicted Welfare in 
in 1980 
1980 
Ages 16-19  in 1980: 
Lived in Welfare Family 
In  1978 Earnings 
Predicted Welfare in 
In  1978 Earnings 
Welfare in 1978 Only 
Welfare in 1979 Only 
Welfare in 1978 and 1979 
In  1978 Earnings 
in 1980 
1980 
Ages 20-23  jn 1980: 
Lived in Welfare Family 
In  1978 Earnings 
Predicted Welfare in 
In  1978 Earnings 
in 1980 
1980 
Welfare in 1978 Only 
Welfare in 1979 Only 
Welfare in 1978 and 1979 
In  1978 Earnings 
-  .553  -  2.29  -  ,105  3.59 
,022  0.08  ,061  1.80 
-.I71  -0.53  ,044  1.35 
.220  5.14  -  .007  -  1.51 
-  ,170  -0.46  ,071  1.78 
,211  4.95  -  ,004  -0.92 
-  ,457  -  1.03  .043  0.94 
- 1.043  -  2.01  .I30  2.51 
-  .219  -0.58  .04  1  1.02 
,213  4.90  -  .006  -  1.21 
-  ,997  -2.70  ,201  3.73 
,294  6.94  -  ,018  -2.88 
,261  0.70  ,041  0.70 
,289  6.87  -  ,019  -  3.03 
-  ,941  -2.33  ,082  1.32 
- 2.254  -4.17  ,197  2.46 
-  ,156  -0.31  ,088  1.18 
,263  6.23  -  ,017  -  2.64 
Source: Regression and probit equations derived from NLS data. 
though the impact on  earnings was not statistically significant, the effect 
on the share neither working nor in school was. In decompositions by 
age, the significant effect on school and work status was concentrated 
in the 16-19  group. On average, 17 percent of this group were in the 
no work, no school category. Moving from zero to one in predicted 
welfare raised that probability by over seven percentage points. 435  Do Welfare Programs Affect School and Work  Patterns? 
These results yield somewhat conservative estimates of welfare ef- 
fects, since they hold constant the youth’s earnings in 1978. If welfare 
status weakened past as well as current labor market outcomes, in- 
cluding the prior  earnings could well understate  the overall welfare 
effects.  It did turn out that the size and significance of the welfare 
variable’s influence on 1980 and 1981 outcomes rose when the youth’s 
1978 earnings did not appear as a control variable. 
A final test of the welfare variables was to calculate whether youth 
outcomes were sensitive to the timing or recent years of welfare par- 
ticipation. Youths wefe classified into one of four statuses: (1) no wel- 
fare in the family during 1978 or 1979; (2) welfare received by the family 
in  1978 but  not  1979; (3) welfare received  in  1979 but not  1978; (4) 
welfare received in both years. 
The results were not entirely consistent with the expectation that 
longer welfare durations lead to worse outcomes. Oddly, those in fam- 
ilies receiving welfare both in  1978 and  1979 had more positive out- 
comes than did those whose families received welfare only in  1979. 
Moreover, the young men in families with two years of welfare did no 
worse in 1980-81  than those whose families received welfare only in 
1978. 
11.4.4  Summary of the Welfare Effects on the Employment Patterns 
of Young Black Men 
The array of results above provides powerful evidence for the im- 
portance of welfare programs, and family characteristics closely as- 
sociated with ’welfare programs, in leading young black men to expe- 
rience serious school and labor market problems. In tests relating the 
family’s receipt of welfare benefits to a variety of youth outcomes in 
both the inner-city, low-income sample and the national sample, welfare 
variables consistently yielded significant and negative effects. Although 
the tests did not disentangle entirely the family influences leading to 
welfare from welfare incentive effects leading to the welfare experi- 
ence, the significance of  the  welfare variable  survived a variety  of 
specifications. 
In  the analysis of the NBER data set, it  became  clear that what 
complicates the interpretation is not  the problem  of  accounting for 
unmeasured family characteristics but rather the problem of isolating 
the impact of welfare from that of the presence of other workers in the 
family. 
The analysis did reveal larger and more consistently negative effects 
on the older  (19-24)  than on the younger  (16-18)  subgroups.  One 
possible reason for these effects is that youth outcomes vary more as 
young men move beyond high school. A second possibility is that the 
more successful older members of welfare families leave home, while 436  Robert Lerman 
the more successful younger members of welfare families remain with 
their parent or parents. This could reconcile the findings, but casting 
doubt on this view is the fact that only a small share of young men 
within the relevant age groups lived away from home. 
11.5  Conclusions and the Implications of Racial Differentials 
Racial differentials in  the share of  youths living with  a family on 
welfare are enormous. With 25 to 30 percent of black youths and only 
5 percent of white youths receiving benefits from the welfare system, 
any welfare effects on youth employment may account for a significant 
part of the large racial differentials in youth employment levels. 
This paper takes some first  steps in  the process of  moving from 
speculating about welfare’s role to estimating the actual size of its role. 
Before developing empirical estimates, I pointed out that the standard 
welfare disincentive effects often do not apply to youth. Nevertheless, 
other mechanisms could be at work to link the youth’s welfare status 
with his poor school and work outcomes. Among them are the expe- 
rience on welfare and the lack of connections to  jobs that come about 
when parents are either not present or not working. 
No doubt several of the mechanisms may interact in ways not easy to 
measure in quantitative  analyses of grouped data. Whatever the precise 
elements going into the observed effects, we can draw some  conclusions 
about welfare’s role in explaining black youth employment problems. 
First, among black male youths living in inner-city ghetto areas, poor 
school and work outcomes were closely associated with welfare status. 
Although the presence of other workers in the family appeared of most 
significance, a family’s receipt  of income-transfer benefits exerted a 
role independent of the presence of workers in the family. And second, 
among black male youths in the nation as a whole, welfare status also 
exerted negative effects on school and work outcomes. Black youths 
were more likely to be neither working nor in school if  they lived in 
welfare families. Moreover, even having simply a higher probability of 
falling into a welfare family, perhaps because of residence in a high- 
benefit state, seemed to worsen school and work outcomes. 
Nothing in these conclusions suggests that it is wise to alter the shape 
or generosity of the current welfare system. The findings do  make clear 
the importance of the linkages between family characteristics, welfare 
programs, and the employment outcomes of young black  men. Un- 
derstanding how  these interactions operate is essential for devising 
policies  that can make a difference for black  youth. It may be, for 
example, that family-centered policies-that  raise  job holding and fam- 
ily stability among black adults-are  the best approach for improving 
the employment chances of black youth. 437  Do Welfare Programs Affect School and Work Patterns? 
Notes 
1.  For example, among white men  18  to 19 years old, the unemployment rate in 
spring 1979 was 24 percent among those in low-income families and  11 percent among 
those in middle- and high-income families. 
2. These figures come from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1982). 
3.  Layard (1982) and Wachter and Kim (1982) both gave cursory treatment to the 
4. Both analyzed youth outcomes on the basis of data generated from the Seattle- 
5. See U.S. Bureau of the Census (1981, 220-23). 
6.  See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1982, p. 41, table 23). 
7.  See, for example, Lerman (1973). 
8.  Under the 1981 amendments, states as  of fiscal year 1982 could not receive federal 
reimbursement for covering any  18-  to 21-year-olds, except those  18  about to finish 
school. Limited evidence is  available on the impact of  this change. A  report by  the 
Children’s Defense Fund (1983) claimed that 29 percent of the substantial fiscal  year 
1982 reduction in Ohio AFDC outlays came about as a result of eliminating students in 
that age bracket. 
role of welfare in explaining youth employment outcomes. 
Denver income maintenance experiment. 
9. See Lerman (1970). 
10.  Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981, 287-312)  provide a discussion of this procedure. 
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Comment  Samuel L. Myers, Jr. 
Lerman’s empirical analysis seeks to address three questions concern- 
ing the interaction of welfare, work, and education. All are of potential 
policy significance. 
His first question is: Do welfare programs alter the current employ- 
ment of young black men? His answer, derived from single equation 
estimates of labor-force choices and earnings is “yes,”  especially for 
black men over age 18. In the NBER data set, Lerman finds a negative 
relationship between coming from a family that received welfare ben- 
efits and various measures of favorable employment outcomes. 
His second question is: Does the mix of family characteristics and 
income-transfer program characteristics affect school enrollment, em- 
ployment, and unemployment among young black men? Apparently, 
Lerman’s answer here is also “yes,”  although it is not clear whether 
the question was or can be adequately addressed using the NBER data. 
Dummy variables for number of wage earners in the family and city 
Samuel L. Myers, Jr., is associate professor of economics at  the Graduate School of 
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were included in multinomial logit regressions for schooling and labor- 
force decisions among NBER black men. The purpose was to isolate 
family and welfare program effects from welfare participation effects. 
Arguably, the city dummies, which provide strikingly large coefficient 
estimates and t-values in the multinomial logit regressions-and  which 
are curiously omitted from the earnings equations-are  less than sat- 
isfactory  proxies  for  welfare  program  characteristics.  In  the  NLS 
regressions, however, state AFDC and food stamp guarantees are used 
to capture program effects. There, the results that Lerman reports show 
mixed responses.  Statistically significant effects of  AFDC and food 
stamp guarantees on the welfare recipiency equations are found among 
the NLS black men. But when the predicted welfare receipt value is 
included as a variable in the employment equations, that variable is 
not found to be highly significant. 
Finally, Lerman asks: To the extent that any welfare-induced effects 
occur, do they account for any of the racial differences in youth em- 
ployment outcomes? This question is left unanswered, although it is 
perhaps the most interesting of all. 
The single-equation framework that Lerman employs in addressing 
each of the questions is clearly inconsistent with his own implicit model 
of jointly endogenous schooling, work, and welfare decisions. Lerman, 
of course, notes the limitations of his estimation procedure and takes 
great pains  to reason  around the  simultaneity problem.  One of  the 
efforts in the paper to account for simultaneity points up the problem 
here.  In table  11.15 Lerman estimates earnings  and unemployment 
equations. When he includes actual welfare participation, its estimated 
impact is highly significant; when he includes predicted welfare, it is 
insignificant at the one percent level. It seems quite likely that welfare 
participation is endogenous and that the OLS estimates on the actual 
welfare variable are biased. 
The really  interesting question looming in this paper,  however, is 
whether welfare explains any of  the racial gap in earnings. The re- 
sults of  Darity and Myers (1980~;  1980b) provide insights that may 
help address this question. Using  1968 and 1978 CPS samples, they 
estimated  log-earnings  and  labor-force  participation  equations  for 
blacks and whites, for both positive income earners and the “poten- 
tial  labor  force.”  Zero-earners  in  the  last  mentioned  group  were 
assigned  the  wage  of  those  in  their  age,  race, gender,  and region 
cohort. 
These equations are simultaneous because earnings depend on labor- 
force participation and labor-force participation depends on (potential) 
earnings. Labor-force participation  also depends on welfare income. 
Thus, it is possible to estimate from the Darity-Myers results the effect 
of welfare income on black-white earnings inequality. Focusing on the 440  Robertkrman 
positive income samples, we find that welfare income lowered blacks’ 
weeks worked and raised their weeks unemployed in 1978, but it had 
no statistically significant impact on the labor-force  participation of 
blacks in  1968 or whites in 1968 or 1978. Moreover, increased labor- 
force participation  reduced racial earnings inequality in the positive- 
income sample. Thus, increased welfare participation can be expected 
to increase racial earnings inequality, at least when estimates are based 
on those who are employed. 
When the potential labor force is the base for estimates, however, 
the answer is reversed. In this expanded sample, increased  welfare 
participation actually reduces earnings inequality; welfare reduces both 
black and white labor-force participation, although more so for whites 
than for blacks. 
Still, whether one uses the positive-income sample or the potential 
labor force, the magnitude of the effect of welfare income recipiency 
is minuscule.  My estimates, based on the Darity-Myers  regressions, 
reveal percentage changes in the 1978 black-white earnings ratio due 
to an increase in welfare recipiency  ranging from  +.0008 to  -.017. 
These extremely inelastic results in both directions dim any hopes of 
finding major new explanations for wage inequality in the phenomenon 
of welfare participation. In principle, one could perform the same ex- 
ercise using the NBER or NLS data. From Lerman’s results alone, I 
suspect that his estimates of the effects of welfare on inequity would 
be much larger.’ 
Lerman argues that there is an association between welfare and the 
schooling and labor market experiences of young black men and women. 
I agree. He suggests that there is a causal relationship  running from 
welfare experiences to employment. His evidence is insufficiently per- 
suasive to warrant acceptance of this simple unidirectional perspective. 
My own view, influenced by  the compelling historical record of the 
continuing and pervasive dependency of the black underclass in the 
United States, is that welfare recipiency, dropping out of school, and 
poor employment are inextricably intertwined in a much more complex 
manner than is admitted in Lerman’s simple model. 
Furthermore, the results showing an effect of family welfare status 
on employment and schooling may be suspect for reasons beyond the 
simultaneous-equations bias.  I am struck by the large number of men 
in the NBER sample who reported themselves to be living at home. 
Could it be that the probability of being in the sample is higher for 
those living at home, whatever their employment and welfare status? 
Could it be that those with low earnings or high unemployment have 
higher probabilities of living at home when the family receives welfare 
income? Lerman’s observed effect of welfare on employment may be 
a simple occurrence of this sample-selection effect. 441  Do Welfare Programs Affect School and Work Patterns? 
In sum, this paper raises a number of  interesting policy questions 
that certainly deserve additional investigation. 
Note 
I. In earlier versions of the paper Lerman estimated that 20 to 90 percent of the racial 
gap was explained by welfare.  Whether this was due to  the  suspicious  nature of  his 
estimates or the age composition of his sample stands to be shown. 
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